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DESTINATION	BASED	TAXATION	OF	CORPORATE	PROFITS	 -	PRELIMINARY	FINDINGS	REGARDING	TAX	
COLLECTION	IN	CROSS-BORDER	SITUATIONS	
by	Marie	Lamensch1	
Abstract	
	
There	is	currently	a	strong	movement	in	the	academic	discussion	of	direct	taxation	to	shift	corporation	
income	taxes	to	a	destination	based	system	where	the	taxing	rights	would	be	allocated	on	the	basis	of	
the	 place	 of	 sales.	 Two	 major	 advantages	 of	 such	 a	 shift	 would	 include	 the	 removal	 of	 current	
complexities	 in	corporate	 income	tax	systems	and	the	curbing	of	tax	base	erosion	and	profit	shifting	
opportunities	for	multinationals.	Among	the	leading	articles	on	the	topic,	only	one	of	them	develops	on	
the	issue	of	tax	collection.	In	this	paper	the	author	suggests	that	this	“implementation	issue”	is	more	
than	a	detail	because	existing	collection	schemes	will	not	do	the	job.	
	
1. Introduction	
Corporate	 income	 tax	 (hereafter	 “CIT”)	 revenue	 have	 been	 under	 huge	 pressure	 in	 recent	 years.	
Estimates	 indicate	 that	 the	 global	 CIT	 revenue	 losses	 could	 be	 between	 4%	 to	 10%	 of	 global	 CIT	
revenues,	 i.e.	USD	100	 to	240	billion	 annually.2	 The	 losses	 arise	 from	a	 variety	 of	 causes,	 including	
aggressive	 tax	 planning	 by	 some	 multinationals,	 the	 interaction	 of	 domestic	 tax	 rules,	 the	 lack	 of	
transparency	 and	 coordination	 between	 tax	 administrations,	 the	 limited	 country	 enforcement	
resources	and	harmful	tax	practices.	These	causes	themselves	are	largely	the	result	of	international	tax	
rules	 designed	 in	 the	 mid-1950s	 that	 have	 become	 outdated	 and/or	 vulnerable	 to	 aggressive	 tax	
planning	in	an	increasingly	global	and	digital	economy.3		
Against	this	background,	on	the	policy	side	the	G20	prompted	the	OECD	to	launch	an	action	plan	with	
a	view	to	tackle	so-called	“base	erosion	and	profit	shifting”	(hereafter	“BEPS”)	in	2013.	Fifteen	actions	
were	 identified	and	reports	 for	each	of	them	have	now	been	released	that	seek	to	propose	new	or	
reinforced	international	standards,	as	well	as	concrete	measures	to	help	countries	tackle	BEPS.	One	of	
the	guiding	principles	of	the	BEPS	project	is	the	willingness	to	reconcile	value	creation	and	taxation.4	In	
this	context,	the	idea	that	States	should	be	able	to	tax	corporate	income	generated	from	sales	made	in	
their	territory	is	making	its	way.	
																																																						
1	 Prof.	 Dr.	Marie	 Lamensch	 teaches	 VAT	 law	 at	 the	 Catholic	 University	 of	 Louvain,	 Taxation	 Principles	 at	 the	 Katholieke	
Universiteit	Leuven	and	International	and	European	Taxation	at	the	 Institute	for	European	Studies	at	the	Vrije	Universiteit	
Brussel,	where	she	also	works	as	a	Senior	Research	Fellow.	She	is	an	academic	member	of	relevant	expert	groups	of	the	OECD,	
the	World	Customs	Organisation	and	the	EU	Commission	and	guest	lectures	at	IBFD's	International	Tax	Academy.	She	is	also	
the	Technical	Editor	of	the	International	VAT	Monitor	(IBFD).	The	author	would	like	to	thank	her	colleague	Dr.	Alice	Pirlot	for	
very	fruitful	discussions	during	the	writing	of	this	article.		
2	 OECD/G20	 (2015):	 Base	 Erosion	 and	 Profit	 Shifting	 Project	 –	 Explanatory	 Statement,	 p.	 4.	 Available	 at:	
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf	
3	M.	Devereux,	R.	de	la	Feria	(2014):	Designing	and	Implementing	a	Destination-Bases	Corporate	Tax”,	Oxford	University	Centre	
for	Business	Taxation	Working	Paper	14/07,	p.	1.	In	a	nutshell,	the	increasing	importance	of	intellectual	property	(IP)	in	MNEs’	
valuations,	the	decreasing	relevance	between	production	and	sales	locations	and	the	fact	that	it	is	less	and	less	clear	where	
value	creation	takes	place	result	in	source	and	residence-based	tax	systems	failing	to	keep	up	(H.	Liebman,	“what	does	US	Tax	
reform	mean	for	global	business	taxation”,	Accountancy	Europe	2017	Tax	Day,	30	May	2017).		
4	See	for	example	the	proposed	amendments	in	the	area	of	transfer	pricing	(BEPS	Action	8-10).	
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At	the	moment	the	exact	outcome	of	the	BEPS	project	is	uncertain,	although	the	EU	Member	States	
have	proactively	started	 implementing	some	targeted	anti-BEPS	measures5	and	the	signature	of	the	
Multilateral	Convention	to	Implement	Tax	Treaty	Related	Measures	to	Prevent	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	
Shifting	(so-called	“MLI”)	on	7	June	2017	is	a	most	promising	development.6	However,	a	major	change	
such	as	a	shift	of	corporate	profits’	place	of	taxation	does	not	seem	likely	to	happen	in	the	near	future.7	 
On	the	academic	side,	the	proposal	for	a	destination	based	type	of	taxation	of	corporate	profit	in	the	
form	of	a	cash	flow	tax	(hereafter	“DBCFT”)	already	appeared	in	the	economic	literature	in	the	early	
2000s	and	continues	being	studied.8	Building	on	this	work,	the	US	Ways	and	Means	Committee	released	
a	Blueprint	 for	 future	tax	reforms	 in	 June	2016	(hereafter	“Ryan	Blueprint”)	 that	 includes	a	 flagship	
reform	aimed	 at	 turning	 the	US	CIT	 system	 into	 a	 form	of	DBCFT.9	 This	 proposal	 has	 already	 been	
commented	in	the	literature10	and	gives	a	new	boost	to	the	academic	work	on	DBCFT.	To	be	noted,	
however,	that	recent	communication	by	the	US	Administration	seems	to	suggest	that	a	slightly	different	
reform	proposal	than	proposed	under	the	Ryan	Blueprint	might	eventually	land	on	the	table	of	the	US	
Senate.11		
After	a	brief	overview	of	the	basic	features	and	legal	critiques	that	can	be	formulated	against	a	DBCFT,	
the	objective	of	this	paper	 is	to	offer	an	in-depth	discussion	of	the	question	how	to	collect	such	tax	
																																																						
5	See	for	example	the	amended	provisions	of	the	Parent-Subsidiary	Directive	(pursuant	to	the	adoption	of	Council	Directive	
(EU)	2015/121	of	27	January	2015	amending	Directive	2011/96/EU	on	the	common	system	of	taxation	applicable	in	the	case	
of	parent	companies	and	subsidiaries	of	different	Member	States,	OJ	L	21,	28.1.2015,	p.	1–3),	the	“modified	nexus	approach”	
proposed	by	the	UK	and	Germany	with	respect	to	“patent	box”	regimes	and	the	recently	adopted	“Transparency	Package”.	
6	The	signature	of	the	MLI	will	indeed	allow	the	signatories	(ie.	68	on	7	June)	transposing	results	from	the	BEPS	project	into	
bilateral	treaties	worldwide.	In	practice	the	MLI	modifies	the	application	of	thousands	of	bilateral	tax	treaties	concluded	to	
eliminate	double	taxation.	It	also	implements	agreed	minimum	standards	to	counter	Treaty	Abuse	and	to	improve	dispute			
resolution	mechanisms	while	 providing	 flexibility	 to	 accommodate	 specific	 tax	 treaty	 policies.	 The	 full	 text	 of	 the	MLI	 is	
available	 at:	 http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-
prevent-BEPS.pdf	
7	A	proposal	for	a	Common	Consolidated	Corporate	Tax	Base	has	been	on	the	table	of	the	EU	Member	States	for	some	time	
and	has	already	been	rejected	once.	The	first	draft	included	common	rules	to	determine	net	taxable	income,	cross	border	
consolidation	of	 losses	and	apportionment	on	the	basis	of	a	formula	that	would	 inter	alia	 take	 into	consideration	place	of	
sales.	The	CCCTB	proposal	is	thus	different	from	the	DBCFT,	albeit	tends	towards	greater	connection	between	taxing	powers	
and	place	of	sales.		
8	Leading	articles	on	the	topic	include	Avi-Yonah	(2000):	Globalization,	Tax	Competition	and	the	Fiscal	Crisis	of	the	Welfare	
State”,	Harvard	Law	Review	113(7),	1573-1676,	S.	Bond,	M.	Devereux	(2002):	“Cash	Flow	Taxes	in	an	open	economy”,	Centre	
for	Economic	Policy	research	Discussion	Paper	Series,	Discussion	paper	3401;	M.	Devereux,	P.	Birch	Sorensen	(2006):	“The	
Corporate	Income	Tax:	International	trends	and	options	for	fundamental	reform”,	European	Commission	Economic	Papers	
264;	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux	and	H.	Simpson	(2010):	“Taxing	Corporate	Income”	in	J.	Mirrlees	et	al.	(Eds),	Dimensions	of	
Tax	Design:	The	Mirrlees	Review	(Oxford	University	Press),	837-893;	A.	Auerbach	and	M.	Devereux	(2012):	Consumption	and	
Cash-Flow	 taxes	 in	 an	 International	 Setting”,	 Oxford	 University	 Centre	 for	 Business	 Taxation,	Working	 Paper	 12/14,	 	 M.	
Devereux,	R.	de	la	Feria	(2014):	Designing	and	Implementing	a	Destination-Bases	Corporate	Tax”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation	Working	Paper	14:07;	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	
Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	Business	Taxation,	WP17/01	and	Reuven,	 	S.	Avi-Yonah	(2017):	“Destination	based	
corporate	tax:	an	alternative	approach”,	Public	Law	and	Legal	Theory	research	paper	Series,	Paper	n°	529,	Law	&	Economics	
research	paper	Series,	Paper	n°	16-028.	To	be	noted	that	Auerbach	already	mentioned	the	concept	in	a	1997	article	published	
in	 the	 American	 Economic	 Review	 (Auerbach,	 Alan	 J.	 (1997):	 “The	 Future	 of	 Fundamental	 Tax	 Reform”,	 in	 the	 American	
Economic	Review,	87(2):	143-146.			
9	 US	 Republican	 Party	 (2016):	 “A	 Better	 Way,	 Our	 Vision	 for	 a	 Confident	 America”,	 available	 at:	
http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf	
10	J.	Becker	and	J.	Englisch,	A	European	Perspective	on	the	US	Plans	for	a	Destination	Based	Cash	Flow	Tax,	Oxford	University	
Centre	for	Business	Taxation,	WP17/03.		
11	See	the	“Tax	Reform	for	Economic	Growth	and	American	Jobs”	one	pager	published	by	the	US	Administration	on	26	May	
2017.		
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when	the	seller	is	an	offshore	company.	This	is	an	issue	that	has	thus	far,	in	the	author’s	view,	not	yet	
been	satisfactorily	addressed.		
	
2. DBCFT	proposals,	their	rationale	and	pitfalls	
	
2.1. From	the	economic	literature	proposals	…	
Proposals	for	a	DBCFT	have	appeared	in	the	economic	literature	in	the	early	2000s.12	DBCFT	have	three	
main	 properties.	 First,	 their	 gross	 tax	 base	 includes	 all	 sales	 receipts	 (hereafter	 “R-base”	 model,	
following	 the	Meade	Committee	 terminology)	 and	 possibly	 also	 net	 financial	 inflows	 including	 new	
borrowings	 and	 interest	 received	 (hereafter	 “R+F	 base”	 model,	 following	 the	 Meade	 Committee	
terminology).13	 Second,	 local	 production	 costs	 are	 immediately	 deductible	 from	 the	 gross	 tax	 base	
(including	labour	costs	and	repayment	of	borrowing	and	interest	payments,	which	means	full	deduction	
upon	 purchase	 rather	 than	 depreciation	 over	 time).	 In	 an	 R+F-base	 approach,	 all	 cash	 outflows	
including	lending,	repaying	borrowing	and	interest	payment	would	also	be	deductible	but	not	under	an	
R-base	 approach.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 loss	 (investments	 exceeding	 taxable	 sales),	 companies	 could	 be	
entitled	to	a	refund	of	the	production	costs	or	a	tax	credit	to	be	offset	against	any	other	tax	liability.	
They	could	also	be	allowed	to	carry	forward.	Third,	exports	are	zero-rated	and	imports	are	taxed.	In	the	
case	of	a	taxed	B2B	import,	a	deduction	is	available	for	the	purchaser	(production	cost).	Alternatively,	
B2B	imports	can	be	left	untaxed	but	in	this	case	there	will	be	no	deduction	for	the	purchaser.14	This	
third	 feature	 (the	 destination	 based	 element)	 would	 be	 a	major	 change	 of	 the	 international	 norm	
governing	taxing	rights	allocation.15		
In	practice	the	DBCFT	would	work	quite	similarly	to	a	VAT.	There	are	some	major	differences,	however.		
	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 fundamental	 difference	 is	 that	 a	 DBCFT	 is	 a	 (direct	 income)	 tax	 that	 targets	
corporate	 profits	while	 a	 VAT	 is	 a(n	 indirect)	 tax	 that	 targets	 consumption.	 The	DBCFT	model	 uses	
“destination”	as	a	proxy	to	allocate	taxation	rights	over	corporate	profits	-	a	proxy	that	is	traditionally	
used	for	taxing	consumption	-	in	order	to	achieve	a	number	of	goals	(see	section	2.3.).	This,	however,	
does	not	change	the	tax	base	and	does	not	mean,	from	a	legal	viewpoint,	that	corporate	taxation	would	
be	replaced	by	consumption	taxation.		
	
On	the	other	hand	from	a	more	technical	viewpoint,	a	first	major	difference	is	that	under	a	DBCFT	all	
investments	incurred	for	local	input	(including	labour	costs)	are	deductible	(whereas	labour	costs	are	
not	deductible	in	a	VAT	system	but	all	other	production	costs	are	in	principle	deductible	or	recoverable	
no	matter	where	they	are	incurred).16	A	second	difference	is	that	under	the	R+F	base	model,	financial	
																																																						
12	See	footnote	8.	See	also	OECD	(2007):	Fundamental	Reforms	of	Corporate	Income	Taxes,	OECD	Tax	Policy	Study	Report	n°	
16,	p.	145.	
13	Pros	and	Cons	of	the	R-base	and	the	R+F	base	approaches	are	discussed	in	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	
(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	45	ff.	
14	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	16.	
15	At	the	moment	the	dominating	principle	in	international	business	taxation	is	the	source	country	principle	whereby	business	
profits	are	to	be	taxed	“at	source”,	which	means	at	the	location	of	production.	Transfer	prices	are	required	in	the	case	where	
there	would	be	several	places	of	production.	
16	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux	and	H.	Simpson	(2010):	“Taxing	Corporate	Income”	in	J.	Mirrlees	et	al.	(Eds),	Dimensions	of	Tax	
Design:	The	Mirrlees	Review	(Oxford	University	Press),	837-893.	
	 4	
services	would	be	included	in	the	tax	base	(whereas	they	are	usually	exempt	for	VAT	purposes).	A	third	
difference	 is	that	the	VAT	 is	traditionally	 levied	on	the	basis	of	the	credit-invoice	method,	while	the	
DBCFT	would	be	levied	on	the	basis	of	annual	assessments	in	each	jurisdiction.	A	last	element	to	take	
into	consideration	is	that	SMEs,	non-profit	(and	public	bodies	in	most	VAT	jurisdictions)	are	typically	
VAT	exempt.		
	
To	be	noted	that	an	alternative	to	the	DBCFT	consisting	in	introducing	a	broad-based	and	single	rate	
VAT	(or	 increasing	existing	VAT	rates	and	aligning	them)	combined	with	a	reduction	of	the	taxes	on	
payroll	(a	labour	tax	cut)	by	the	same	proportion	(hereafter	“VAT+LTC”)	is	also	being	studied.17	In	this	
case	the	tax	base	changes	radically	and,	from	a	legal	perspective,	the	nature	of	the	tax	changes	(from	
direct	 to	 indirect	 –	 different	 taxpayer)	 and	 the	 tax	 burden	 is	 shifted	 from	 corporate	 profits	 to	
consumption	 expenditures.	 However,	 a	 VAT+LTC	 and	 a	 DBCFT	 would,	 in	 economic	 terms,	 be	
equivalent.18	In	practice	the	VAT+LTC	option	would	require	to	introduce	a	VAT	or	to	raise	existing	VAT	
rate.	 In	the	case	of	an	existing	VAT	system,	one	standard	rate	should	be	applied	(and	multiple	rates	
abolished)	and	traditional	exemptions	applied	for	social	considerations	should	be	suppressed.	In	order	
to	tackle	financial	services	(which	are	being	exempt	for	technical	rather	than	social	considerations),	a	
specific	cash	flow	tax	should	also	be	introduced.	The	VAT+LTC	option	thus	seems	easier	to	implement	
in	jurisdictions	not	yet	having	a	VAT	system	that	are	able	to	start	from	a	blank	page.	This	having	been	
said,	introducing	a	VAT	is	never	an	easy	step	because	it	has	an	immediate	impact	on	prices,	even	if	it	
may	be	expected	that	the	reduction	of	labour	taxes	will	eventually	neutralise	the	price	rise.	It	has	also	
been	highlighted	that	the	payroll	subsidy	element	might	not	always	be	easy	to	implement,	typically	in	
the	absence	of	extensive	payroll	taxes.19		
	
Also	to	be	noted	that	the	economic	literature	is	not	advocating	for	a	blunt	replacement	of	the	CIT	with	
a	 DBCFT.	 The	 scholars	 indeed	 consider	 a	 “gradual	 replacement”	 or	 even	 implementation	 “in	
isolation”.20	Gradual	implementation	would	also	probably	be	easier	in	the	case	of	the	VAT+LTC	option.		
	
	
2.2. …	To	the	Ryan	Blueprint	
	
In	June	2016,	the	US	Ways	and	Means	Committee	released	a	Blueprint	for	possible	future	tax	reforms	
entitled:	“A	Better	Way	–	Our	Vision	for	a	Confident	America”	(The	Ryan	Blueprint).21	A	key	element	of	
the	Ryan	Blueprint	is	the	proposal	to	drastically	reform	the	US	CIT	system	as	we	know	it	and	to	introduce	
a	form	of	DBCFT.22	
	
																																																						
17	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01.	
18	The	key	elements	that	would	be	needed	to,	respectively	transform	a	typical	CIT	into	a	DBCFT	and	to	adopt	the	VAT-based	
approach	are	summarised	in	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	
Oxford	University	Centre	for	Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	65	ff.	
19	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	67.	
20	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	20.	
21	 US	 Ways	 and	 Means	 Committee,	 A	 Better	 Way	 –	 Our	 Vision	 for	 a	 Confident	 America,	 available	 at:	
https://abetterway.speaker.gov	
22	For	a	summary	description	of	the	Ryan	Blueprint,	see	part	I	of	R.S.	Avi-Yonah	and	K.	Clausing,	Problems	with	Destination-
Based	Corporate	Taxes	and	the	Ryan	Blueprint,	Colum.	J.	Tax	L.	8,	no.	2	(2017),	pp.	229-55.		
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However,	an	important	difference	between	the	Ryan	Blueprint	and	the	form	of	DBCFT	proposed	in	the	
economic	literature	is	that	tax	losses	incurred	by	US	companies	would	not	be	refunded	or	converted	
into	a	tax	credit,	but	rather	infinitely	carried	forward.	In	the	case	of	pure	exporters	(whose	revenue	are	
exempt	under	a	DBCFT),	there	would	therefore	be	no	possibility	to	recover	these	costs.23	
	
Also	to	be	noted	that	the	Ryan	Blueprint	proposes	to,	legally	speaking,	leave	B2B	imports	untaxed	but	
to	indirectly	tax	them	by	denying	the	business	purchaser	a	deduction	for	the	cost	of	imported	products,	
services	and	intangibles	(which	as	 indicated	above	is	the	alternative	to	the	“purest”	situation	where	
B2B	imports	would	be	taxed	and	the	business	purchaser	could	deduct	the	purchase	as	a	production	
cost).	
	
Finally,	a	unilateral	implementation	is	considered	by	the	Ways	and	Means	Committee	while	the	scholars	
who	 have	 developed	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 DBCFT	 recommend	 a	 global	 implementation	 or	 at	 least	
simultaneous	implementations	by	a	large	group	of	countries.24			
	
	
2.3. Rationale	for	a	DBCFT	
	
In	 general,	 taxing	 at	 destination	 (at	 the	 place	 of	 residence	 of	 the	 customer)	 has	 the	 advantage	 of	
associating	the	tax	with	a	proxy	that	is	not	mobile	(or	at	least	much	less	mobile	than	other	proxies)	and	
therefore	is	expected	to	not	change	as	a	result	of	 introducing	the	tax.25	As	a	consequence,	a	DBCFT	
would	thwart	profit	shifting	as	currently	occurring	widely	through	lendings	from	a	low	tax	country	to	a	
high	tax	country,	through	locating	intangible	assets	that	earn	a	royalty	or	licence	payment	in	a	low	tax	
country	 and	 through	 manipulated	 transfer	 prices.26	 Moreover,	 it	 would	 also	 suppress	 tax	 rate	
competition	(as	the	applicable	tax	rate	would	only	depend	on	the	location	of	the	customer,	which	is	a	
rather	immobile	proxy	as	just	mentioned).	This	having	been	said,	the	consequences	would	probably	be	
much	different	in	the	case	of	a	unilateral	implementation	as	compared	to	a	global	implementation	or	
at	least	compared	to	an	implementation	by	a	group	of	States	(at	the	EU	or	OECD	levels	for	example).	
As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	positive	effects	in	terms	of	thwarting	aggressive	tax	planning	strategies	would	
still	be	acquired	by	a	State	acting	unilaterally,	but	new	opportunities	of	tax	avoidance	by	companies	
located	 outside	 of	 its	 territory	 would	 arise.27	 An	 additional	 concern	 in	 the	 case	 of	 unilateral	
implementation	is	the	potential	risk	of	double	taxation	(probably	no	credit	available).	
																																																						
23	Becker	and	Englisch	note	that	these	may	actually	become	attractive	targets	for	mergers	and	acquisitions	by	companies	with	
a	positive	taxable	income	in	the	US.	See	J.	Becker	and	J.	Englisch,	A	European	Perspective	on	the	US	Plans	for	a	Destination	
Based	Cash	Flow	Tax,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	Business	Taxation,	WP17/03,	p.	6.	
24	See	A.J.	Auerbach	and	D.	Hotlz-Eakin	(2016):	“The	Role	of	Border	Adjustments	in	International	taxation”,	American	Action	
Forum.	 Also	 in	 that	 sense	 (although	 considering	 the	 two	 options	 of	 a	 unilateral	 and	 a	 multilateral	 implementation):	 A.	
Auerbach,	M.	 Devereux,	M.	 Keen,	 J.	 Vella	 (2017):	 “Destination-based	 Cash	 Flow	 Taxation”,	 Oxford	 University	 Centre	 for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01	
25	M.	Devereux,	R.	de	 la	Feria	 (2014):	Designing	and	 Implementing	a	Destination-Bases	Corporate	Tax”,	Oxford	University	
Centre	for	Business	Taxation	Working	Paper	14:07,	p.	2.	
26	More	detailed	explanations	are	offered	in	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	
Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	40	ff.	
27		A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	5.	For	more	on	possible	effects	of	a	unilateral	implementation	(and	means	to	adjust	the	system	
in	 case	 of	 unilateral	 implementation),	 see	 J.	 Becker	 and	M.	 Jung,	 Unilateral	 Introduction	 of	 Destination-Based	 Corporate	
Income	 Taxation,	 available	 at:	 https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=PET15&paper_id=377	
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A	DBCFT	also	has	the	advantage	of	ensuring	equal	treatment	to	debt	and	equity	as	a	source	of	finance.	
Under	an	R-base	model,	financial	flows	are	excluded	(irrespective	of	whether	they	are	associated	with	
debt	or	equity).	Under	an	R+F	base	model,	all	financial	flows	are	taken	into	account.	Accordingly,	there	
is	 no	 need	 for	 rules	 to	 police	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 two	 and	 it	 also	 suppresses	 the	 need	 for	
complex	anti-avoidance	rules	such	as	CFC	rules,	thin	capitalisation	rules	and	exit	tax	rules.28	But	again,	
a	unilateral	implementation	would	run	the	risk	of	double	taxation.	
	
Interestingly	also,	the	fact	that	multinationals	are	not	paying	CIT	where	they	make	sales	is	nowadays	
perceived	 by	 the	 public	 as	 amounting	 to	 tax	 avoidance	 and	 to	 an	 unfair	 sharing	 of	 the	 overall	 tax	
burden.	In	contrast,	taxing	profits	where	the	sales	are	being	made	would	allow	aligning	taxation	and	
value	creation	and	would	be	perceived	as	being	“fairer”.	
	
A	(wide	implementation	of	a)	DBCFT	would	thus	address	many	of	the	failures	of	current	CIT	systems.29	
However,	it	would	also	means	that	“destination”	would	become	the	proxy	for	allocating	taxing	rights	
over	corporate	profits.	A	discussion	over	the	legitimacy	or	theoretical	ground	of	such	a	proxy	would	go	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	but	the	author	concurs	with	the	view	that	States’	“entitlement”	to	the	
tax	 originating	 within	 their	 border,	 as	 a	 recognised	 basis	 for	 source	 taxation,	 can	 also	 apply	 to	
destination	based	taxation.30	It	may	also	be	argued	that	selling	goods	and	services	to	a	local	customer	
base	creates	a	“genuine	link”	between	the	taxpayer	and	the	destination	country	which	is	a	legitimate	
basis	for	taxation.31	Some	authors,	however,	highlighted	that	from	an	inter-nation	equity	perspective,	
net	exporting	States	would	provide	 infrastructure,	 legal	protection	and	other	goods	and	services	 to	
companies	 but	would	 receive	 no	 tax	 revenue	while	 net	 importing	 states	would	 tax	without	 having	
providing	such	“benefits”	to	companies.32	Other	(assuming	a	wide	implementation)	suggest	that	in	view	
of	the	fact	that	a	DBCFT	permits	to	thwart	base	erosion	and	profit	shifting,	all	States	should	eventually	
be	able	to	maintain	or	increase	their	tax	base.33	
	
The	US	is	thus	far	the	only	jurisdiction	where	a	DBCFT	is	officially	considered	as	a	possible	option	to	
reform	the	current	system	of	taxation	of	corporate	profits.	At	the	moment	the	US	has	a	quite	high	CIT	
rate	(35%),	which	encourages	offshore	intellectual	property	(IP)	and	manufacturing.	In	addition,	the	US	
also	applies	a	worldwide	tax	system	(thus	also	taxes	dividends	from	foreign	subsidiaries).	Because	they	
do	not	have	a	VAT,	the	perception	from	a	US	perspective	is	that	while	US	company	pay	a	high	CIT	and	
moreover	have	to	add	VAT	on	the	products	that	they	sell	to	the	EU	(or	to	any	other	jurisdictions	applying	
a	VAT),	importers	to	the	US	usually	benefit	from	lower	CIT	and	moreover	do	not	have	to	add	a	VAT	on	
																																																						
28	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	31.	
29	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	7.	
30	M.	Devereux,	R.	de	 la	Feria	 (2014):	Designing	and	 Implementing	a	Destination-Bases	Corporate	Tax”,	Oxford	University	
Centre	for	Business	Taxation	Working	Paper	14/07,	with	reference	to	R.	Musgrave	and	P.	Musgrave	(1984):	Public	Finance	and	
Theory	in	Practice,	McGraw-Hill.	
31	W.	Schön	 (2016):	 “Destination-Based	 Income	Taxation	and	WTO	Law:	A	Note”,	Max	Planck	 Institute	 for	 Law	and	Public	
Finance	Working	Paper	2016-03,	p.	1.	
32	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	34.	
33	M.	Devereux,	R.	de	 la	Feria	 (2014):	Designing	and	 Implementing	a	Destination-Bases	Corporate	Tax”,	Oxford	University	
Centre	for	Business	Taxation	Working	Paper	14/07,	p.	13.	
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their	prices	when	selling	to	US	customers.	This	would	therefore	result	in	an	“unlevel	playing	field”.34	
With	a	view	to	address	this	situation,	the	Ryan	Blueprint	proposes	to	lower	down	CIT	rates	(20%	for	
corporations;	25%	 for	pass-through	businesses),	 to	 repeal	worldwide	 tax	on	dividends	 from	 foreign	
subsidiaries	(replacing	it	with	a	participation	exemption	regime	similar	to	those	in	force	in	several	EU	
countries)	and	to	disincentive	offshoring	by	changing	to	destination-based	cash	flow	tax.	In	addition,	
the	US	tax	code	(known	for	its	complexity)	would	be	simplified	by	broadening	the	base	and	treating	
debt	similar	to	equity.	The	expected	result	is	that	the	incentive	created	by	the	US	tax	system	to	locate	
operations	outside	of	the	US	will	be	removed	and	that	US	products	would	compete	on	a	more	equal	
footing	in	both	the	US	and	the	global	market.35	
	
It	is	noteworthy	that	on	26	April	2017	the	US	Administration	summarized	the	President's	current	ideas	
for	 a	 “Tax	 Reform	 for	 Economic	 Growth	 and	 American	 Jobs”	 in	 a	 one-page	 proposal	 that	 slightly	
deviates	 from	 the	 Ryan	Blueprint.	 The	 proposal	 is	 very	 succinct,	 only	 including	 the	 following	 bullet	
points	for	what	concerns	“business	taxation”:	
	
- 15%	business	tax	rate		
- Territorial	system	to	level	the	playing	field	for	American	companies	
- One	time	tax	on	trillions	of	dollars	held	overseas	
- Eliminate	tax	breaks	for	special	interests	
	
The	envisaged	business	 tax	 rate	 (15%)	would	therefore	be	 lower	 than	the	25%	proposed	under	 the	
Ryan	Blueprint	 and	 the	Border	Adjustment	 Tax	 is	 no	 longer	mentioned.	 In	 fact,	 due	 to	 the	 current	
political	situation	in	the	US	(and	the	prominence	of	the	health	care	bill),	one	may	doubt	that	any	major	
tax	reform	could	be	completed	by	the	end	of	the	year.	This	development	should	hopefully	not	halt	the	
work	done	in	academia	regarding	the	potential	advantages	of	a	DBCFT	or	an	equivalent	VAT/LTC.		
	
2.4. Compatibility	with	bilateral	Treaties	and	with	WTO	law	
	
The	legal	pitfalls	of	the	DBCFT	and	the	Ryan	Blueprint	have	already	been	extensively	discussed	in	the	
literature36	 and	 are	 only	 briefly	 mentioned	 here	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	 paper	 that	 focuses	 on	 tax	
collection.		
	
A	first	issue	concerns	the	impossibility	for	non-residents	businesses	making	sales	into	a	country	applying	
the	DBCFT	to	deduct	their	production	costs.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	gross	taxation	of	imports	proceeds	
would	contravene	Article	III	of	the	GATT	which	prohibits	internal	tax	systems	that	discriminate	imports	
																																																						
34	R.S.	Avi-Yonah	and	K.	Clausing,	Problems	with	Destination-Based	Corporate	Taxes	and	the	Ryan	Blueprint,	Colum.	J.	Tax	L.	
8,	no.	2	(2017),	p.	234.	
35	Ryan	Blueprint	at	26-27.	See	however	J.	Becker	and	J.	Englisch,	A	European	Perspective	on	the	US	Plans	for	a	Destination	
Based	Cash	Flow	Tax,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	Business	Taxation,	WP17/03	for	a	radically	different	analysis	of	the	potential	
effects	on	US	businesses	of	a	unilateral	implementation	of	a	DBCFT	by	the	US.	
36	See	for	example	Wolfgang	Schön,	Destination-Based	Income	Taxation	and	WTO	Law:	A	Note,	Max	Planck	Inst.	for	Tax	Law	
and	Pub.	Fin.,	Working	Paper	No.	03,	2016;	Wei	Cui,	Destination-Based	Taxation	in	the	House	Republican	Blueprint,	173	Tax	
Notes	 Today	 7	 (2016);	 R.S.	 Avi-Yonah	 and	 K.	 Clausing,	 Problems	 with	 Destination-Based	 Corporate	 Taxes	 and	 the	 Ryan	
Blueprint,	Colum.	J.	Tax	L.	8,	no.	2	(2017),	pp.	229-55;	J.	Becker	and	J.	Englisch,	A	European	Perspective	on	the	US	Plans	for	a	
Destination	Based	Cash	Flow	Tax,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	Business	Taxation,	WP17/03.	
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by	according	less	favourable	treatment	to	them	than	to	“like”	or	“competing”	domestic	products.37	
A	second	point	of	concern	regarding	WTO	compliance	is	that	the	exemption	of	exports	(proper	to	the	
border	adjustment	 feature	of	 the	 tax)	would	 likely	qualify	as	a	prohibited	export	subsidy	within	 the	
meaning	 of	 Article	 XVI	 GATT,	 3.1.(a)	 ASCM	 because	 the	 DBCFT	 is	 nothing	 more	 than	 a	 modified	
consumption-style	tax	imposed	on	an	income	base	which,	as	such,	is	not	a	border	adjustable	tax	under	
the	WTO	rules	(only	indirect	taxes	are	border	adjustable).38		
Third,	 considering	 the	 DBCFT	would	 still	 qualify	 as	 an	 income	 tax,	 basically	 all	 bilateral	 double	 tax	
Treaties	would	have	to	be	terminated	or	amended	(for	example	the	requirement	under	Article	7	of	the	
OECD	Treaty	Model	that	an	enterprise	should	have	a	permanent	establishment	on	the	territory	of	the	
taxing	State	for	that	State	to	be	allowed	to	tax	 its	profit	should	be	removed).	 In	the	case	where	the	
DBCFT	were	not	 to	be	 considered	 as	 falling	within	 the	 ambit	 of	 bilateral	 tax	 Treaties,39	 a	 State	not	
applying	the	DBCFT	would	not	be	obliged	to	grant	any	credit	against	the	tax	levied	by	a	State	applying	
a	DBCFT.40	
	
As	noted	above,	scholars	have	noted	that	implementing	a	VAT	(or	increasing	a	VAT	rate)	combined	with	
a	 payroll	 subsidy	would	 –	 in	 economic	 terms	 –	 	 achieve	 the	 same	 result	 as	 a	DBCFT	 (the	VAT+LTC	
option).	In	this	case,	importers	and	exporters	would	be	allowed	to	deduct	their	input	VAT	no	matter	
where	it	was	incurred	and	an	additional	payroll	subsidy	would	be	available	locally	to	give	a	relief	that	
would	be	similar	to	a	labour	tax	cut.	A	lower	payroll	tax	as	a	separate	tax	measure	would	not	fall	within	
the	scope	of	Article	 III	GATT.41	 It	would	not	be	a	prohibited	(export)	subsidy	either,	because	neither	
export	related	nor	specific.	Moreover,	this	combination	would	not	fall	under	the	ambit	of	double	tax	
Treaties.42	 In	 view	 of	 the	 above,	 the	 question	 arises	 whether	 the	 VAT+LTC	 does	 not	 receive	more	
attention,	the	more	so	 in	view	of	the	fact	that	 international	recommendations	regularly	push	 in	the	
direction	of	a	shift	from	direct	income	taxes	towards	indirect	(broad	based)	consumption	taxes	in	both	
developed	and	less	developed	economies.	43		
	
																																																						
37	The	question	may	be	raised	whether	it	would	contravene	Article	III:2	GATT	that	prohibits	the	taxation	of	imports	“in	excess”	
of	like	domestic	products	because	a	DBCFT,	as	a	direct	tax,	does	not	apply	on	products	(although	the	wording	of	Art.	III	par.2	
GATT	does	not	only	apply	to	“internal	taxes”	but	also	to	“internal	charges	of	any	kind”	and	prohibits	“direct	and	indirect”	tax	
discrimination).	 But	 in	 any	 case	 it	 would	 contravene	 Article	 III:4	 that	 prohibits	 tax	 systems	 according	 less	 favourable	 tax	
treatment	to	imports	than	to	like	products	of	national	origin	(In	that	sense	See:	United	States	—	Tax	Treatment	for	“Foreign	
Sales	Corporations”,	DS108	and	confirmation	in	Argentina	–	Measures	Relating	to	Trade	in	Goods	and	Services	(DS453).	
38	 Pursuant	 to	 a	 1970	 GATT	 Working	 Party	 Report	 on	 Border	 Tax	 Adjustments	 (available	 at:	
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90840088.pdf)	and	the	explanatory	notes	to	Article	XVI	GATT	in	Annex	I	and	
in	footnote	1	to	Article	1.1.(a)(1)(ii)	ASCM.	See	also	R.S.	Avi-Yonah	and	K.	Clausing,	Problems	with	Destination-Based	Corporate	
Taxes	and	the	Ryan	Blueprint,	Colum.	J.	Tax	L.	8,	no.	2	(2017),	p.	239.	To	be	noted	that	the	Ryan	Blueprint	holds	that	the	
proposal	does	not	raise	any	WTO	compliance	concerns	because	the	cash	flow	focus	of	the	tax	amounts	to	a	consumption	
based	approach.	However,	the	Ryan	proposal	admittedly	maintains	some	typical	features	of	the	income	tax,	such	as	the	use	
of	a	tax-inclusive	rate,	the	taxation	of	net	investment	income,	the	flow-through	treatment	of	partnerships	and	the	deduction	
of	wages.	
39	 As	 suggested	 by	 A.	 Auerbach,	M.	 Devereux,	M.	 Keen,	 J.	 Vella	 (2017):	 “Destination-based	 Cash	 Flow	 Taxation”,	 Oxford	
University	Centre	for	Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	82.	
40	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	82.	
41	It	would	also	not	fall	within	the	scope	of	Article	XVII	GATS.	
42	Similar	conclusions	by	(President’s	Advisory	Panel,	2005;	Hufbauer,	1996;	Schön,	2016.)		
43	The	IMF	and	the	WB	usually	expect	from	developing	countries	to	which	they	are	lending	funds	that	they	start	levying	value-
added-taxes	 as	 part	 of	 the	 reform	of	 their	 tax	 system.	 A.	 Schenk,	O.	Oldman,	Value-added-tax,	 a	 Comparative	 Approach	
(Cambridge	Tax	Law	Series,	2007),	p.	18.	
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This	having	been	said,	and	as	noted	already,	in	this	case	the	tax	burden	on	consumption	would	become	
heavier.	 In	 spite	 of	 an	 arguable	 economic	 equivalence,	 it	may	 be	 difficult	 to	 convince	 citizens	 that	
increasing	consumption	taxes	and	at	the	same	time	reducing	taxation	on	corporate	profits	would	be	a	
fair	development	(keeping	in	mind	that	the	immediate	effect	would	be	a	rise	in	prices	and	that,	in	short	
term	at	least,	it	would	not	entirely	be	compensated	by	the	reduction	of	labour	tax	costs).	
	
2.5. Summary		
	
Summing	up,	 the	 idea	of	a	DBCFT	has	 flourished	 in	 the	economic	 literature	as	a	possible	means	 to	
address	major	deficiencies	of	current	CIT	systems	including	an	increasing	complexity,	a	discrimination	
of	investment	source	(debt/equity)	and	opportunities	for	profit	shifting	practices.	More	recently	it	has	
been	taken	up	by	the	US	Ways	and	Means	Committee	as	a	possible	means	to	relaunch	and	protect	US	
production	(although	the	fate	of	a	major	tax	reform	in	the	short	term	remains	uncertain).	
	
Most	of	the	academic	discussion	has	thus	far	focused	on	the	DBCFT	tax	base	and	the	compatibility	of	
the	tax	with	bilateral	Treaties	and	WTO	law.	In	contrast,	only	little	discussion	has	taken	place	concerning	
the	issue	of	tax	collection.	The	remainder	of	this	paper	will	focus	on	that	aspect.	In	spite	of	very	little	
reference	to	the	question	in	the	literature,	 it	 indeed	seems	of	utmost	 importance	to	assess	to	what	
extent	a	DBCFT	or	the	economically	equivalent	VAT+LTC	would	be	“collectable”	or	“enforceable”,	 in	
particular	in	the	case	where	the	taxpayer	is	an	offshore	company.		
	
3. Collecting	a	destination	based	cash	flow	tax	
	
3.1. When	is	it	a	challenge?	
	
In	the	case	of	domestic	sales	the	DBCFT	is	to	be	levied	from	resident	businesses.	Resident	business	may	
submit	tax	returns	and	the	tax	administration	is	able	to	monitor	the	declarations	through	traditional	
risk	assessment	procedures	and	audits	(taxpayers	are	within	jurisdictional	reach).	
	
In	the	case	of	imports	the	DBCFT	is	to	be	levied	from	offshore	businesses	(beyond	jurisdictional	reach).	
In	this	case,	States	will	encounter	similar	difficulties	than	under	the	VAT	system	to	ensure	the	payment	
of	 the	 tax.	 As	 indicated	 above,	 one	way	 to	 simplify	 the	matter	 is	 to	 leave	 B2B	 imports	 completely	
untaxed	and	to	disallow	the	deduction	for	the	purchaser	(rather	than	taxing	them,	with	a	deduction	
then	available	for	the	purchaser).44	This	is	the	option	taken	in	the	Ryan	Blueprint	(in	this	case	collection	
is	only	an	issue	in	the	case	of	B2C	imports).	However,	it	may	prove	difficult	to	distinguish	between	B2B	
and	B2C	supplies,	both	for	the	supplier	and	for	the	tax	administration	having	to	monitor	the	correct	
application	of	the	tax.		
	
The	 existing	 literature	 refers	 to	 a	 collection	 procedure	 designed	 in	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 area	 of	 VAT	 as	 a	
possible	way	forward	to	collect	the	DBCFT	in	cross-border	situations.	Upcoming	sub-section	3.2.	and	
3.2.	seek	to	clarify	why	current	VAT	collection	models	for	cross-border	supplies	have	not	proven	fully	
																																																						
44	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	16.	
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satisfactory	and	why,	in	particular,	the	EU	so-called	“MOSS	system”	should,	in	the	author’s	opinion,	not	
serve	as	model	to	collect	a	DBCFT	on	imports.	Sub-section	3.4.	then	investigates	possible	alternatives.	
	
3.2. Vendor	 registration	 as	 the	 traditional	model	 for	 collecting	 VAT	 –	 domestic	 v.	 cross-border	
situations	
	
Vendor	collection	is	the	backbone	of	the	VAT	system	as	designed	in	the	1950s.45	It	has	contributed	to	
the	revenue	generating	capacity	of	this	tax	on	consumption	and	consequently	to	its	impressive	success	
(more	than	160	countries	nowadays	apply	a	form	of	VAT).46	At	a	time	when	the	bulk	of	transactions	
were	domestic,	relying	on	businesses	to	collect	the	tax	(as	part	of	the	sales	price)	indeed	proved	to	be	
an	efficient	and	effective	way	to	proceed.	This	is	because	of	the	limited	number	of	tax	collectors	(as	
compared	 to	 final	 consumers)	 and	 the	 advantage	 of	 the	 deduction	method	 as	 a	means	 to	 ensure	
neutrality	for	businesses	and	to	 incentivise	tax	collection	(all	 input	VAT,	 i.e.	production	costs	except	
labour	costs,	is	in	principle	deductible	against	output	VAT,	i.e.	the	VAT	charged	to	the	customer).	
	
Another	major	paradigm	of	the	VAT	system	is	that,	in	a	cross	border	situation,	the	tax	should	ideally	be	
levied	 in	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 presumed	 consumption:	 “at	 destination”.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	
“International	VAT/GST	Guidelines”	issued	by	the	OECD	and	in	international	practice.47	The	reason	is	
that	such	an	allocation	of	taxing	rights	avoids	distortion	of	competition	among	suppliers	from	different	
jurisdictions,	as	the	same	VAT	burden	will	apply	in	the	domestic	marketplace	irrespective	of	the	location	
of	the	supplier	(thereby	avoiding	forum	shopping).		
	
In	 a	 cross	 border	 scenario,	 however,	 a	 major	 weakness	 of	 the	 vendor	 collection	 model	 under	 a	
destination	based	system	is	that	a	disconnect	arises	between	the	substantive	jurisdiction	of	the	taxing	
States	 (ie.	 the	 right	 to	 levy	 the	 tax)	 and	 enforcement	 jurisdiction	 (i.e.	 the	 means	 to	 enforce	 the	
collection	of	the	taxes)48	because	in	such	a	scenario,	the	tax	collector	 is	 located	offshore	and	States	
jurisdictional	powers	are	limited	to	national	boundaries	(taxpayers	are	“beyond	jurisdictional	reach”	as	
indicated	above).	For	the	reasons	mentioned	above	the	application	of	the	destination	principle	should	
not	be	called	into	question	because	the	alternative	(an	origin	based	taxation,	i.e.	taxation	in	-	and	at	
the	rate	of	-	the	jurisdiction	of	the	supplier)	would	create	an	incentive	for	customers	to	purchase	from	
suppliers	located	in	low	VAT	jurisdictions	and	would	in	turn	incentivise	businesses	to	locate	in	such	low	
VAT	jurisdictions	in	order	to	be	able	to	offer	lower	prices.	The	solution	should	therefore	rather	lie	in	
designing	an	appropriate	 collection	model	 for	 implementing	 a	destination	based	 system	 in	 a	 cross-
border	scenario.	
	
																																																						
45	 Von	 Siemens	 first	 proposed	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 value-added-tax	 in	 1919	 (C.F.	 von	 Siemens,	 Veredelte	 Umasatzsteuer	
(Siemenstadt,	1919).	In	1921,	Adams	developed	the	“credit	invoice	method”	to	prevent	tax	cumulation	in	view	of	a	potential	
implementation	 in	 the	 US,	 which,	 however,	 never	materialised	 (Th.	 S.	 Adams,	 Fundamental	 Problems	 of	 Federal	 Income	
Taxation,	35	Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics,	p.	527	(1921).	France	was	eventually	the	first	country	to	introduce	a	value-added-
tax	in	1954	(Introduced	by	the	Act	n°	54-404	of	10	April	1954.	Journal	Officiel	of	11	April	1954	and	Rectificatif	Journal	Officiel	
of	20	May	1954),45	based	on	the	proposal	of	Lauré,	then	joint	director	of	the	French	tax	authority	(M.	Lauré,	La	Taxe	sur	la	
valeur	Ajoutée	(Sirey,	1952).		
46	OECD	Consumption	Tax	Trends	2016,	p.	19.	
47	OECD	International	VAT/GST	Guidelines.	At	the	moment,	the	guidelines	only	cover	services	and	intangibles.	
48	The	concepts	of	“enforcement	jurisdiction”	v.	“substantive	jurisdiction”	have	been	developed	by	Walter	Hellerstein.	See	for	
example	W.	Hellerstein,	Jurisdiction	to	impose	and	enforce	Income	and	Consumption	Taxes:	Towards	a	Unified	Conception	of	
Tax	Nexus	in	Value-added-taxes	and	Direct	Taxation,	eds.	M.	Lang,	P.	Melz	and	E.	Kristoffersson	(IBFD,	2009),	p.	545.	
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When	international	trade	started	developing,	the	bulk	of	cross-border	trade	concerned	tangible	assets.	
Procedures	other	than	based	on	a	pure	vendor	model	have	been	put	into	place	for	imports	of	goods	in	
order	to	avoid	a	situation	where	the	taxpayer	would	be	located	offshore	(usually	“customs	procedures”	
whereby	 tax	 assessment	 and	 collection	 is	 being	 effected,	 or	 at	 least	 monitored,	 by	 customs	
authorities).49	In	contrast,	inbound	services	have,	for	a	long	time,	remained	untaxed.	However,	when	
the	volume	of	cross-border	trade	in	services	and	intangibles	started	to	increase,	several	States	decided	
that	they	could	not	afford	leaving	these	supplies	untaxed	indefinitely.	50	The	vendor	collection	model	is	
currently	presented	by	the	OECD	as	the	best	alternative	for	collecting	VAT	on	 inbound	services	and	
intangibles	to	private	consumers,	in	spite	of	the	lack	of	enforcement	jurisdiction	of	the	taxing	states	
under	this	model.51	
	
With	a	view	to	“encourage”	compliance	of	offshore	vendors,	the	EU	has	since	2003	been	providing	for	
an	(optional)	simplified	vendor	registration	system	for	non-EU	businesses	supplying	electronic	services	
and	intangibles	(“electronically	supplied	services”	 in	EU	language)	to	EU	final	consumers.	Under	this	
system,	the	non-EU	suppliers	are	being	offered	the	possibility	to	register	in	the	Member	State	of	their	
choice	(“Member	State	of	identification”)	and	to	declare	and	pay	the	VAT	related	to	all	their	supplies	
of	electronic	services	to	EU	final	consumers	through	that	Member	State	of	identification,	who	is	then	
required	to	redistribute	the	revenue	collected	between	the	different	Member	States	of	consumption.	
This	 system	 (so-called	 mini	 “one-stop-shop”	 or	 “MOSS”)	 is	 a	 simplification	 as	 compared	 to	 the	
alternative	consisting	in	registering	in	each	Member	State	(although,	in	practice	it	still	requires	from	
suppliers	that,	in	their	single	tax	returns	they	specify,	for	each	transaction,	the	place	of	residence	of	the	
consumer	and	the	VAT	related	to	the	transaction	in	order	to	enable	the	Member	State	of	identification	
to	 proceed	 to	 the	 redistribution).52	 Unfortunately,	 however,	 the	 level	 of	 compliance	 to	 this	 (initial	
version	of)	the	MOSS	(see	below	recent	developments)	has	been	extremely	low:	only	539	businesses	
were	 registered	 in	 January	 2014	 (thus	 11	 years	 after	 the	 scheme	 had	 been	 put	 into	 place).53	 As	
discussed	above,	the	main	reason	is	that	while	the	EU	Member	States	may	have	the	substantive	right	
to	tax	the	supplies	made	to	their	consumers,	they	lack	the	practical	means	to	require	the	collection	of	
the	taxes	from	businesses	that	are	located	beyond	their	jurisdictional	reach.	They,	in	particular,	lack	the	
means	 to	 enforce	 compliance	 in	 the	 case	 of	 supplies	 of	 services	 and	 intangibles	 that	 do	 not	 cross	
physical	borders.		
																																																						
49	This	concerns	imports,	ie.	supplies	made	by	suppliers	located	in	a	non-EU	country	to	EU	consumers.	Due	to	the	absence	of	
internal	borders	in	the	EU,	intra-EU	supplies	have	been	subject	to	specific	rules.	On	the	one	hand,	the	general	rule	provides	
that	EU	consumers	traveling	to	another	EU	country	pay	the	local	VAT	on	their	purchases.	On	the	other	hand,	special	rules	have	
been	adopted	for	tackling	so-called	“distance	sales”,	covering	sales	made	over	the	Internet	and	other	mail	orders	under	which	
businesses	with	a	turnover	below	a	given	threshold	charge	VAT	at	origin	while	businesses	with	a	turnover	above	the	given	
threshold	have	to	register	and	collect	the	VAT	in	the	country	of	destination	(Article	33	and	34	of	the	VAT	Directive).	
50	The	EU	acted	as	a	pioneer	by	taxing	inbound	electronically	supplied	services	at	destination	already	since	2003.	In	the	past	
years	several	other	jurisdictions	started	to	apply	VAT/GST	to	supplies	by	non-resident	suppliers	of	electronic	services	to	final	
consumers	in	their	jurisdictions,	for	example,	Switzerland,	Norway,	Iceland,	South	Africa,	Korea,	Japan,	Liechtenstein,	Russia,	
Albania,	 India,	New	Zealand.	Several	other	 jurisdictions	are	contemplating	similar	systems,	 for	example,	Australia,	Taiwan,	
Serbia,	Belarus,	Thailand,	Turkey,	Indonesia,	Israel,	Singapore,	Tunisia,	Morocco,	Paraguay,	Canada	and	Malaysia.	
51	OECD	International	VAT/GST	Guidelines.	
52	See	M.	Lamensch	(2015):	Tax	Assessment	in	a	Digital	Context:	A	Critical	Analysis	of	the	2015	EU	Rules,	in	“Value	Added	Tax	
and	the	Digital	Economy:	The	2015	EU	Rules	and	Broader	Issues”,	eds.	M.	Lamensch,	E.	Traversa	and	S.	van	Thiel,	Kluwer,	
EUCOTAX	Series	on	European	Taxation	Vol.	46,	p.	39.	
53	Most	of	them	in	the	United	Kingdom	(266),	the	Netherlands	(111),	Germany	(43),	Ireland	(41)	and	Luxembourg	(28).	Only	
15	had	registered	in	France,	14	in	Italy,	8	in	Sweden,	4	in	Malta,	3	in	Denmark,	2	in	Spain,	1	in	Belgium,	Bulgaria,	Cyprus	and	
Greece,	 and	 none	 in	 Austria,	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 Croatia,	 Estonia,	 Finland,	 Hungary,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	 Poland,	 Portugal,	
Romania,	and	Slovakia	(figures	communicated	by	the	UK	Treasury	in	January	2014).	
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Since	1	 January	2015,	 a	MOSS	procedure	 is	 also	available	 to	EU	 suppliers	of	 electronically	 supplied	
services	(as	well	as	of	telecommunication	and	broadcasting	services),	with	reasonable	success	(mid-
2016,	12.899	EU	businesses	had	registered54).	In	contrast,	the	level	of	compliance	by	non	EU	businesses	
remains	 very	 limited:	 1.079	 registrations,	 even	 after	 the	promotion	 campaign	 run	by	 the	European	
Commission	all	around	the	globe.55		
In	spite	of	these	figures,	the	EU	Member	States	are	currently	discussing	a	proposal	submitted	by	the	
European	Commission	 to	broaden	 the	 scope	of	 the	MOSS	 to	 also	 include	 imports	 of	 goods.	 At	 the	
moment,	customs	authorities	are	responsible	for	the	assessment	and	collection	of	the	VAT	on	imports	
of	goods	with	a	value	higher	than	EUR	22	(goods	with	a	value	below	the	EUR	22	threshold	are	being	
exempt,	irrespective	of	the	supplier’s	turnover).	However,	the	increasing	volume	of	imports	due	to	the	
development	of	e-commerce	results	 in	 increasing	administrative	costs,	 including	warehousing	costs,	
for	the	customs	authorities.	In	addition,	it	is	estimated	that	in	2015	there	was	144	million
	
consignments	
benefitting	from	the	VAT	exemption	(more	than	a	300%	increase	over	the	last	15	years).	In	addition	to	
the	“loss”	of	revenue	resulting	from	the	exemption,	major	frauds	are	detected	with	the	possibility	that	
VAT	 foregone	 could	 be	 as	 high	 as	 EUR	 1	 billion	 in	 2015.56	 As	 a	matter	 of	 fact,	 offshore	 businesses	
routinely	make	making	false	value	declarations	in	order	to	remain	under	the	EUR	22	threshold	and	to	
benefit	 from	 the	 VAT	 exemption.	 To	 address	 that	 situation	 the	 European	 Commission	 proposes	 to	
remove	 the	 threshold	and	 to	 replace	 the	 customs	procedure	with	a	new	system.57	 If	 the	European	
Commission	proposal	is	adopted,	there	would	be	two	possibilities	for	non-EU	businesses.	On	the	one	
hand,	suppliers	willingly	registering	to	the	enlarged	MOSS	would	benefit	from	a	“fast	track”	procedure	
(no	stop	at	the	border)	and	declaration	and	payment	of	the	VAT	by	the	offshore	supplier	should	take	
place	via	periodical	returns	(thus	after	the	import	and	delivery	to	the	customer	has	taken	place).	On	
the	other	hand,	a	fall	back	procedure	is	foreseen	whereby,	in	the	absence	of	MOSS	registration	by	the	
offshore	supplier,	the	person	responsible	for	the	transport	of	the	goods	would	become	liable	for	the	
assessment,	collection	and	payment	of	the	VAT,	again	via	periodical	returns.	In	this	case,	the	standard	
rate	of	VAT	would	systematically	apply	and	customer	entitled	to	a	reduced	rate	would	have	to	introduce	
a	separate	customs	declaration.	 
The	proposal	is	currently	being	discussed	by	the	EU	Member	States.	As	extensively	discussed	elsewhere,	
it	 raises	a	number	of	 concerns.58	A	main	concerns	 is	 that	nothing	 is	 foreseen	 to	 tackle	 the	 issue	of	
undervaluations	 (even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 threshold,	 a	 lower	 value	 offers	 a	 lower	 VAT	 burden).	
However,	on	the	one	hand	a	MOSS	registration	would	offer	a	fast	track	and	the	only	possible	controls	
of	 the	 VAT	 declared	 and	 paid	 by	 offshore	 suppliers	 will	 be	 made	 through	 audits	 after	 the	 MOSS	
declarations	have	been	made	(But	how	efficient	will	audits	be	at	that	stage?	What	will	be	the	available	
information	to	run	the	controls?	How	to	audit	offshore	companies?	Does	the	proposal	take	for	granted	
that	offshore	businesses	will	duly	declare	and	remit	their	taxes	through	the	MOSS	even	if	they	know	
																																																						
54	This	level	of	registration	is	being	presented	as	a	major	success	by	the	European	Commission.	The	question	may	however	be	
raised	whether	a	little	less	than	13.000	registrations	corresponds	to	the	number	of	EU	businesses	selling	cross-border	services	
and	intangibles	to	EU	consumers.	
55	European	Commission	(2016):	Impact	assessment	accompanying	Commission	Proposal	2016(757),	p.	74.	
56	 EY	 Study	 for	 the	 Commission	 –	 available	 at:	
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/studies/execsummary_lvcr	-study.pdf.		
57	Proposal	for	a	Council	Directive	amending	Directive	2006/112/EC	and	Directive	2009/132/EC	as	regards	certain	value	added	
tax	obligations	for	supplies	of	services	and	distance	sales	of	goods,	COM(2016)	757	final.	
58	M.	Lamensch,	European	Commission’s	New	Package	of	Proposals	on	E-Commerce:	A	Critical	Assessment,	International	VAT	
Monitor,	2017	(Volume	28),	No.	2.	
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that	 States’	 means	 of	 control	 are	 very	 limited?).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 transport	 sector	 (and	 in	
particular	 the	 postal	 companies)	 do	 not	 have	 the	means	 to	 detect	 false	 declarations	 of	 value	 to	 a	
satisfactory	level.	A	study	by	Copenhagen	Economics	indeed	found	that	65%	of	consignments	from	non-
EU	suppliers	through	the	public	postal	channels	were	non-compliant59	(in	the	case	where	the	goods	are	
declared	as	being	exempt,	they	are	fed	directly	into	the	postal	flow	often	without	any	customs	controls	
and	as	indicated	above	this	simplified	border	crossing	for	low	value	goods	is	being	largely	abused	by	
offshore	suppliers).	This	is	significant	as	it	is	estimated	that	70%	of	transactions	are	sent	through	public	
postal	channels.60	As	the	MOSS	would	remain	optional	(and	results	in	IT	investments,	the	requirement	
to	make	periodical	returns	and	to	appoint	a	fiscal	representative),	it	may	be	expected	that	the	number	
of	parcels	on	which	VAT	will	have	to	be	collected	by	the	transporters	will	be	substantial	(meaning	that	
frauds	will	become	ever	more	difficult	to	monitor).			
The	 EU	 VAT	 system	 has	 been	 a	 model	 for	 many	 of	 the	 VAT	 systems	 that	 exist	 around	 the	 globe.	
Unsurprisingly,	therefore,	other	States	are	following	suit	and	have	implemented	or	are	in	the	process	
of	implementing	a	vendor	collection	model	for	imports	of	both	goods	and	services.	61	This	evolution	is,	
in	the	author’s	view,	problematic,	both	from	a	business	perspective	(how	many	registrations	will	be	
necessary	 to	 run	a	cross-border	activity	 if	 “simplified”	 registration	 systems	are	adopted	around	 the	
globe?)	 and	 from	 a	 States’	 perspective	 (compliance	 cannot	 be	 properly	 enforced;	 the	 situation	 is	
particularly	 problematic	 for	 services	 and	 intangibles	 as	 in	 this	 case	 States	 do	 not	 even	 have	 the	
possibility	to	run	random	controls	at	the	border).		
	
In	any	case,	this	model	does	not,	in	the	author’s	view,	seem	promising	at	all	for	collecting	a	DBCFT	or	
VAT+LTC	in	the	future,	as	will	be	further	developed	in	the	next	section.	
	
	
3.3. A	MOSS	system	for	collecting	a	DBCFT?	
	
The	question	how	to	collect	a	DBCFT	has	largely	been	left	aside	for	the	moment.	In	fact,	only	Devereux	
and	de	la	Feria	have	discussed	it.62	In	a	nutshell,	the	scholars	suggest	that	in	both	B2B	and	B2C	imports	
the	DBCFT	could	be	collected	on	the	basis	of	a	MOSS	approach,	under	which	a	given	country	(A)	may	
collect	 the	 tax	 on	 behalf	 of	 another	 country	 (B).	 In	 practice,	 the	 tax	 authorities	 of	 both	 countries	
(collecting	taxes	for	each	other)	would	do	an	aggregate	reconciliation	across	all	transactions	in	a	given	
period	 (though	 a	 clearing	 house).	 Enforcement	 jurisdiction	 would	 therefore	 be	 passed	 to	 another	
country	(the	one	where	the	tax	collector	is	established)	in	order	to	become	effective,	while	substantive	
jurisdiction	would	remain	in	the	country	of	destination.	A	collection	fee	would	be	retained,	to	be	netted	
																																																						
59	 Copenhagen	 Economics,	 E-commerce	 imports	 into	 Europe:	 VAT	 and	 Customs	 treatment,	 2016,	 available	 at:	
(https://www.copenhageneconomics.com/publications/publication/e-commerce-imports-into-europe-vat-and-	 customs-
treatment	This	study	was	carried	out	on	behalf	of	UPS	by	making	approximately	400	real	purchase	brought	to	delivery	via	e-
commerce	platforms	located	in	US,	Canada,	Japan,	India	and	China.	Delivery	was	made	to	7	destination	Member	States.	50%	
of	purchases	were	via	express	operators	with	50%	via	public	postal	operators.	VAT	was	due	on	all	 the	consignments	and	
customs	duties	were	due	on	45%	of	the	consignments.	
60	European	Commission	(2016):	Impact	assessment	accompanying	Commission	Proposal	2016(757),	p.	16.	
61	Norway	(since	July	2011),	Switzerland	(since	January	2010),	Iceland	(since	November	2011),	South	Africa	(since	July	2014),	
Korea	(since	July	2015)	and	Japan	(since	October	2015).	Australia	should	be	next	(and	New	Zealand	and	the	Russian	Federation	
are	thinking	about	it).	Of	course,	none	of	these	States	are	able	to	offer	single	points	of	registration	at	a	regional	level	like	in	the	
EU.	
62	M.	Devereux,	R.	de	 la	Feria	 (2014):	Designing	and	 Implementing	a	Destination-Bases	Corporate	Tax”,	Oxford	University	
Centre	for	Business	Taxation	Working	Paper	14/07,	p.	20.	
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out	in	a	final	settlement	between	countries.	The	scholars	further	suggest	that	the	MOSS	system	would	
tackle	the	issue	of	mispricing	of	intra-group	transactions	because	in	the	case	of	an	export	from	A	to	B	
being	routed	through	a	tax	haven	H,	export	from	A	will	be	exempt,	import	to	H	would	be	taxed	at	a	very	
low	rate	but	would	then	have	to	tax	the	export	to	B	at	B’s	rate.	H	would	have	to	collect	the	revenue	
and	pay	it	to	B,	with	exactly	the	same	outcome	as	if	the	sales	had	been	made	directly	from	A	to	B.	
	
Although	in	theory	this	proposal	may	seem	attractive,	in	practice	it	assumes	participation	of	all	States	
to	the	MOSS	system,	including	tax	havens.	More	precisely,	it	assumes	that	all	States	would	be	willing	to	
collect	taxes	for	each	other	and	to	audit	companies	established	within	their	territory	for	the	purpose	
of	ensuring	the	correct	application	of	other	States’	income	taxes	(even	in	the	case	of	a	net	exporting	
country	who	would	thus	be	required	to	collect	the	taxes	of	other	States	even	if	it	would	itself	end	up	
with	a	negative	tax	base).	The	other	way	around,	it	assumes	that	States	are	willing	to	trust	that	other	
States	will	duly	collect	their	taxes	and	conduct	the	necessary	audits	to	that	effect.	The	author	is	of	the	
opinion	that	such	a	system	could	never	be	implemented	in	practice.	Asking	from	States	that	they	place	
the	responsibility	to	collect	their	main	source	of	revenue	into	the	hands	of	many	different	States	around	
the	world	does	indeed	not	seem	realistic	at	all	(for	example:	expecting	from	China	that	they	audit	their	
businesses	to	make	sure	that	they	pay	a	correct	amount	of	DBCFT	to	the	US	seems	unrealistic).63	Also,	
even	 assuming	 that	 joint	 audits	 and	 mutual	 assistance	 would	 become	 legally	 possible,	 it	 seems	
unreasonable	to	expect	from	States	that	they	oblige	to	the	many	requests	that	would	be	formulated	
by	States	around	the	world	(because	complete	trust	cannot	be	expected	as	indicated	above).	It	may	
perhaps	be	envisaged	between	the	EU	Member	States,	engaged	into	an	economic	integration	process	
and	having	adopted	several	instruments	of	mutual	cooperation	(and	still	there,	the	question	whether	
cooperation	is	effective	for	what	concerns	the	MOSS	remains	an	open	question	because,	to	the	author’s	
knowledge,	MOSS	audits	are	not	taking	place).	In	contrast,	it	would,	in	the	author’s	opinion,	never	be	
possible	with	third	countries.		
	
Additional	 controls	 should	 then	 be	 considered,	 such	 as	 monitoring	 of	 inbound	 flows	 of	 goods.	 As	
discussed	above	in	the	area	of	VAT,	such	controls	are	hardly	feasible,	even	with	the	implementation	of	
a	threshold	(based	on	parcel	value)	and	major	frauds	based	on	undervaluations	are	to	be	expected.	
	
In	the	case	of	inbound	services	and	intangibles,	controls	at	the	border	are	simply	impossible.	The	only	
possibility	would	be	to	have	controls	carried	out	by	the	collecting	States.	Once	again,	it	does	not	seem	
reasonable	to	expect	from	States	that	they	entrust	other	States	with	the	responsibility	to	monitor	the	
correct	declaration	and	payment	of	their	income	taxes.	
	
Summing	up,	a	MOSS	system	does,	 in	the	author’s	view,	not	seem	promising	for	the	collection	of	a	
DBCFT.	 In	 the	case	where	States	would	consider	 the	 introduction	of	 the	VAT+LTC	option,	 the	 same	
conclusions	can	be	made	as	for	the	VAT	system.	
	
	
	
																																																						
63	Recent	success	in	the	area	of	exchange	of	information	such	as	the	setting	up	of	a	multilateral	framework	under	the	auspices	
of	the	OECD	should	not	lead	us	to	think	that	similar	cooperation	(that	still	needs	to	be	proven	effective)	could	take	place	for	
what	concerns	collection.	Helping	other	jurisdictions	by	exchanging	information	is	one	thing	-	collecting	taxes	for	each	other	
is	a	very	different	type	of	commitment.		
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3.4. Alternative	collection	methods	
	
3.4.1. 	Reconciling	substantive	and	enforcement	jurisdiction	under	a	customer	or	a	third	party	
collection	model	
	
The	 rather	 negative	 conclusion	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 regarding	 the	 option	 to	 rely	 on	 a	 MOSS	
procedure	to	collect	a	DBCFT	or	a	VAT+LTC	on	offshore	vendors	 invites	a	debate	regarding	possible	
alternatives.	The	issue	is	important	because	a	State	willing	to	introduce	a	DBCFT	cannot	afford	to	not	
be	able	to	enforce	the	payment	of	the	tax	on	imports	(in	particular	in	view	of	the	booming	development	
of	e-commerce	and	of	a	“digital	economy”	in	general).		
	
The	key,	in	the	author’s	view,	is	not	to	pass	enforcement	jurisdiction	to	someone	else	but	to	look	for	a	
means	to	reconciliate	substantive	and	enforcement	jurisdiction.		
One	way	 to	 reach	 that	 objective	would	 be	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 customer	who	would	 always	 be	within	
jurisdictional	reach	of	the	taxing	state.	Customer	collection	is	already	applied	in	some	cases	of	business	
to	business	(B2B)	supplies	(for	example	in	the	EU:	the	“reverse	charge”	system).	In	fact,	as	indicated	
above,	B2B	supplies	could	be	left	out	of	the	tax	base	in	the	case	of	a	DBCFT	(an	option	that	has	been	
adopted	by	 the	Ryan	Blueprint).	However,	a	major	difficulty	 is	 to	distinguish	between	B2B	and	B2C	
supplies.	
For	what	concerns	cross-border	supplies	to	final	consumers	(B2C	supplies),	both	the	US	(subnational	
States)	and	Canada	have	been	marginally	applying	customer	collection	rules	 for	consumption	taxes,	
albeit	 with	 very	 low	 levels	 of	 compliance	 so	 that	 international	 policy	 guidelines	 advise	 against	 it.	
Moreover,	customer	collection	models	have	been	 largely	 ignored	so	 far	 in	 the	VAT	 literature,	often	
without	much	consideration.	For	example,	Devereux	and	de	la	Feria	hold	that	“two	options	open	to	the	
destination	country	are	to	collect	the	tax	from	the	company	or	from	the	customer.	The	former	appears	
to	be	the	more	realistic	option,	although	not	without	difficulties	of	its	own,	especially	in	the	absence	of	
fiscal	borders	or	for	digital	products,	as	is	clear	from	the	operation	of	VAT”.64	Unfortunately,	and	in	spite	
of	the	obvious	shortcomings	of	the	vendor	collection	model,	the	scholars	do	not	further	 investigate	
customer	collection	as	a	possible	option.		
	
The	main	reasons	traditionally	argued	to	reject	customer	collection	in	the	case	of	B2C	supplies	include	
the	fact	that	final	consumers	neither	have	the	skills	to	voluntarily	proceed	to	the	remittance	of	the	tax,	
nor	any	incentive	to	do	so	in	view	of	the	fact	that	tax	administrations	have	limited	means	to	track	the	
supplies.	The	need	to	audit	millions	of	taxpayers	is	also	perceived	as	a	major	obstacle.		
	
However,	with	a	novel	method	(based	on	the	opportunities	offered	by	new	technologies),	making	it	
very	simple	for	customers	to	pick	up	and	allowing	the	tax	administration	to	track	any	single	transaction	
generating	the	right	to	levy	a	tax,	the	author	suggests	that	these	drawbacks	could	be	removed.	Once	
this	 is	done,	the	author	argues	that	–	at	 least	for	what	concerns	VAT	(and	sales	taxes)	–	a	customer	
collection	model	would	outperform	a	vendor	collection	model	against	the	traditional	benchmark	of	a	
“good	tax	system”	laid	down	by	the	OECD	(neutrality,	effectiveness,	efficiency,	simplicity	and	certainty,	
																																																						
64	A.	Auerbach,	M.	Devereux,	M.	Keen,	J.	Vella	(2017):	“Destination-based	Cash	Flow	Taxation”,	Oxford	University	Centre	for	
Business	Taxation,	WP17/01,	p.	81.	
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proportionality	and	 flexibility).65	 The	 two	main	 reasons	are,	 first,	 that	enforcement	 (effectiveness)66	
would	be	greatly	facilitated	in	the	first	place	because	the	VAT	due	would	in	principle	no	longer	leave	
the	 territory	of	 the	 taxing	State	and	 therefore	 substantive	 jurisdiction	and	enforcement	 jurisdiction	
would	finally	be	realigned,	reducing	or	even	suppressing	the	need	for	international	cooperation	(while,	
under	the	vendor	collection	model,	VAT	paid	by	the	customer	to	the	foreign	supplier	first	leaves	the	
territory	of	 the	taxing	State,	and	 is	 then	supposed	to	be	remitted	to	the	taxing	state	by	the	foreign	
supplier,	but	without	certainty	that	this	will	be	done	and	with	mutual	assistance	as	the	only	means	to	
monitor	 the	 situation).	 Second,	 because	 appropriate	 processes	 and	 big	 data	 technology	 have	 the	
potential	to	enable	the	tax	administration	to	identify	when	a	VAT	is	due,	and	to	ensure	its	collection	in	
a	timely	and	simple	fashion	(simplicity).	Efficiency	would	also	be	maximized,	on	the	one	hand,	because	
audit	procedures	would	be	streamlined	on	the	basis	of	automatically	generated	data	and,	on	the	other	
hand,	because	verification	obligations	 for	suppliers	would	be	removed	 (also	offering	 legal	certainty,	
simplicity	and	proportionality),	which	would	finally	allow	micro	and	small	and	medium	sized	enterprises	
to	compete	on	an	equal	footing	with	multinationals	(neutrality).	In	addition,	risks	of	double	taxation	or	
unintended	 non-taxation	 in	 the	 case	 of	 supplies	 made	 via	 platforms	 will	 also	 be	 removed	 (again:	
effectiveness,	and	also	neutrality	in	the	sense	that	double	taxation	is	an	impediment	to	trade).		
	
The	 author	 is	 currently	 working	 on	 two	 models	 that	 seek	 to	 create	 a	 “geo-fence”	 around	 VAT	
jurisdictions67:	 the	 iVAT	and	the	PAYS	models.68	 In	practice,	 the	PAYS	and	 iVAT	solutions	do	monitor	
inbound	movements	of	goods	and	outbound	payments	with	the	objective	to	support	VAT	declaration	
and	payment	by	the	customer.	 In	a	nutshell,	under	the	PAYS	system	goods	entering	the	country	are	
being	 tagged	 upon	 import	 and	 tracked	 until	 delivered	 (a	 series	 of	 “events”	 are	 being	 pushed	 on	 a	
government	portal	which	provides	full	visibility	to	the	tax	administration).	Once	the	goods	are	delivered,	
the	 customer	 is	 invited	 to	 declare	 and	 pay	 the	 VAT	 (big	 data	 technology	 is	 being	 used	 to	monitor	
declarations	and	payments).	As	to	the	 iVAT	model,	 it	supports	customer	collection	of	VAT	through	a	
secure	VAT	gateway	that	funnels	payment	transaction	data	to	a	secure	government	portal	and	pre-fills	
the	 VAT	 declarations	 for	 the	 customer.	 If	 applied	 in	 combination,	 the	 data	 related	 to	 inbound	
movements	 of	 goods	 and	 outbound	 payments	 can	 be	 reconciled	 for	 even	 more	 robust	 protection	
against	fraud.	
	
Another	possibility	would	be	to	make	a	“local”	third	party	liable	for	the	collection	of	the	tax,	such	as	the	
financial	 intermediary	 processing	 the	 payment.	 Such	 a	 model	 usually	 raises	 doubts	 regarding	 the	
feasibility	and	opportunity	of	involving	financial	intermediaries	into	tax	collection,	mostly	for	reasons	of	
liability	and	costs	allocation	(they	are,	for	that	reason,	also	largely	ignored	in	the	literature).	However,	it	
																																																						
65	See	OECD	(2014):	“Fundamental	Principles	of	Taxation,	in	Addressing	the	Tax	Challenges	of	the	Digital	Economy,	OECD/G20	
Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting	Action	1,	Chapter	2.			
66	Economists	will	 know	 that	 the	OECD	and	 legal	 scholars	give	a	different	meaning	 to	 the	 terms	“efficiency”,	 “neutrality”,	
“effectiveness”	etc.	than	is	being	given	in	the	economic	literature.	OECD/Legal	terminology	is	here	being	used.	
67	Location	based	services	(LBSs)	are	not	new.	Citizens	use	applications	that	rely	on	LBS	on	a	daily	basis	(e.g.	to	find	the	nearest	
restaurants	or	for	being	notified	about	a	retailers’	offer	when	in	a	close	proximity	of	a	shopping	centre).	In	a	nutshell,	LBSs	
collate,	filter,	compile	and	deliver	information	based	on	the	location	of	any	user.	“Geo-fencing”	is	a	type	of	LBS,	which	triggers	
a	location-based	event	whenever	a	user	enters	or	exits	a	“geo-fence”,	i.e.	a	pre-defined	virtual	geographical	boundary.	One	
step	 further,	 “tax	 geo-fencing”	 is	 the	 creation	of	 a	boundary	 (physical	 or	 virtual)	 around	global	 economies	with	 a	 view	 to	
mitigate	tax	revenue	leakage	due	to	cross-border	trade.	
68	The	author	collaborates	with	an	IT	researcher	and	IT	designers	on	this	project.	The	underlying	technology	has	already	been	
developed	(proof	of	concept	stage).	Please	contact	the	author	if	you	wish	to	know	more	about	this	research.	
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should	be	noted	that	Italy	recently	introduced	a	so-called	“split	payment”	procedure	for	VAT	on	business-
to-government	supplies,69	that	Costa	Rica	may	soon	implement	such	a	split	payment	procedure	for	VAT	
on	business-to-consumer	online	sales70	and	that	the	UK	HMRC	has	published	a	call	for	evidence	on	split	
payments	mechanisms	for	cross-border	VAT.	Under	these	systems,	the	banks	operating	payments	are	
required	to	collect	and	pay	the	corresponding	VAT	to	the	tax	administration.71	In	the	same	way	as	in	a	
customer	collection	model,	substantive	and	enforcement	jurisdictions	can	be	reconciled	under	such	a	
split	payment	(third	party)	collection	model.72		
	
In	 the	 author’s	 view,	 customer	 or	 third	 party	 collection	 models	 represent	 promising	 solutions	 for	
collecting	VAT	in	the	future.	For	the	purpose	of	this	article,	the	question	is	whether	one	of	these	models	
could	be	relied	on	to	collect	a	DBCFT	or	the	economically	equivalent	VAT+LTC	option.	Some	preliminary	
thoughts	on	this	question	are	offered	in	the	next	section.	
	
	
3.4.2. 	A	customer	or	a	third	party	collection	model	for	the	DBCFT	or	VAT+LTC?	
	
A	third	party	collection	model	for	the	DBCFT	
	
A	customer	collection	model	for	the	DBCFT	would	be	conceptually	challenging	because,	while	there	
would	be	no	difficulty	to	have	the	VAT(indirect	consumption	tax)	paid	by	the	customer	“on	top”	of	the	
net	sales	price	(as	they	currently	do	when	the	product	is	imported	and	they	have	to	pay	the	VAT	upon	
importation),	the	same	probably	does	not	apply	to	a	tax	on	companies’	profits	(direct	income	tax)	that	
should	rather	be	“taken	out”	of	the	sales	proceeds	and	not	paid	as	“a	supplement”	by	the	customer.	In	
fact,	 this	 is	 probably	 more	 of	 a	 challenge	 for	 lawyers	 (and	 for	 the	 citizens	 having	 to	 pay	 the	 tax	
separately)	than	for	economists	who	would	argue	that	the	impact	of	the	tax	is	on	the	customer	anyway	
(although	less	visible).		
	
In	any	case,	a	split	payment	procedure	(third	party	collection	model)	whereby	a	fraction	of	the	sales	
price	paid	by	the	customer	is	being	withheld	by	the	bank	and	paid	directly	to	the	Treasury	might	be	
preferable.	 Under	 such	 a	 system,	 and	 contrary	 to	 a	MOSS	 approach,	 the	 taxing	 State	 would	 keep	
enforcement	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 tax	 collector	 (banks)	 and	 would	 therefore	 be	 able	 to	 enforce	
compliance.	Such	a	system	could	apply	in	both	B2B	and	B2C	imports.	
	
However,	 technical	 limits	 of	 a	 traditional	 split	 payment	 system	 include,	 first,	 that	 banks	 should	
cooperate	and	duly	collect	the	tax	on	offshore	payments	(they	can	be	required	to	do	so	by	law).	Second,	
cash	payments	would	not	be	covered	(but	in	the	case	of	imports	it	may	be	assumed	that	cash	payments	
																																																						
69	 EU	Council	 of	Ministers	Decision	 2015/1401	 of	 14	 July	 2015	 authorizing	 the	 Italian	Government	 to	 introduce	 the	 split	
payment	mechanism	for	all	purchases	by	the	Public	Administration.		
70	See	M.	Tenorio	(2017):	“Experience	with	the	VAT	withholding	regime	in	Costa	Rica”,	presentation	made	at	the	2017	OECD	
Global	VAT	Forum	on	13	April	2017.	
71	For	the	sake	of	clarity,	it	is	worth	highlighting	that,	in	contrast	with	a	traditional	split	payment	procedure,	under	a	customer	
collection	model	such	as	the	iVAT	system	briefly	described	above,	banks	would	not	have	to	collect	the	tax:	they	simply	would	
have	to	include	the	possibility	to	pair	bank	accounts	in	order	to	allow	payment	information	to	be	funnelled	to	the	government	
portal.	
72	The	author	had	proposed	a	similar	system	in	M.	Lamensch	(2015):	“European	Value-added	Tax	in	the	Digital	Era:	A	Critical	
Analysis	and	Proposals	For	Reform”,	Amsterdam,	IBFD	Doctoral	Series,	2015,	vol.	36.	She	however	added	the	proposal	that	
software	fed	with	data	extracted	from	banks’	KYC	databases	be	used	for	an	automated	assessment	of	the	VAT	due.	
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are	not	really	an	option).	Third,	under	such	system,	the	offshore	vendor	will	receive	less	money	than	
he	charged	(and	this	could	raise	difficulties	for	example	if	the	vendor	then	refuses	to	serve	the	client).	
Banks	could	also	“charge”	an	additional	amount	when	proceeding	to	the	payment	rather	than	withhold	
part	of	the	price	charged,	but	this	would	perhaps	again	be	conceptually	challenging	in	the	case	of	a	tax	
that	should	be	paid	by	the	seller	and	not	the	customer	(once	again,	economists	may	find	this	nuance	
irrelevant).	
	
A	customer	or	a	third	party	collection	model	for	the	VAT+LTC	option	
	
A	third	party	collection	model	could	also	apply	in	the	case	of	the	VAT+LTC	option.	In	this	case	the	VAT	
could	either	be	withheld	from	the	amount	paid	by	the	customer	or	charged	on	top	of	the	sales	price	
charged	by	the	supplier.	The	latter	option	avoids	cases	where	the	supplier	would	refuse	to	serve	the	
customer	and	would	be	conceptually	more	acceptable	for	the	customers	(than	in	the	case	of	a	DBCFT)	
who	are	already	used	(in	VAT	jurisdictions)	to	pay	the	VAT	separately	upon	importation	(together	with	
customs	duties;	the	same	applies	for	customers	in	use	tax	jurisdictions).	
	
Naturally,	being	largely	composed	of	a	VAT,	the	author	also	suggests	that	a	customer	collection	models	
such	as	the	one	proposed	under	the	PAYS	and	the	iVAT	solutions	could	be	used	for	the	implementation	
of	the	VAT+LTC	option.	While	the	PAYS	and	the	iVAT	solutions	mentioned	above	were	developed	to	
tackle	the	issue	of	VAT	collection	on	B2C	imports	from	e-commerce,	there	is	no	reason	why	it	could	not	
also	apply	to	B2B	imports	(as	it	is	similar	to	a	reverse	charge	system,	albeit	more	robustly	addresses	
frauds	thanks	to	big	data	technology).		
	
As	noted	above,	the	VAT+LTC	option	has	the	advantage	of	not	raising	WTO	issues.	It,	however,	comes	
with	other	disadvantages.	On	the	one	hand	for	States	already	having	a	VAT	system,	such	as	the	EU,	it	
would	likely	require	a	broadening	of	the	tax	base	and	a	simplification	of	the	rate	structure	(this	could	
be	regarded	as	a	no	go;	however	nothing	ever	stays	the	same	and	countries	with	a	complex	VAT	system	
may	at	some	point	decide	to	simplify	their	structure	out	of	necessity	–	which	is	a	recommendation	that	
has	been	formulated	by	the	IMF	and	the	OECD	for	a	long	time	anyway)	and	would	moreover	translate	
in	a	limited	but	immediate	increase	of	prices	(even	if	the	price	rise	would	eventually	be	neutralised	by	
the	LTC).	On	the	other	hand	for	a	State	not	yet	having	a	VAT,	it	would	imply	a	(substantial)	price	rise	for	
consumers	(even	if	the	price	rise	would	again	eventually	be	neutralised	by	the	LTC).	In	federal	States	
like	the	US	it	would	moreover	mean	a	shift	of	tax	jurisdiction	from	the	states	to	the	Federation.	
	
A	greater	tax	burden	on	consumption	at	the	same	time	as	a	reduction	of	the	tax	burden	on	corporate	
profits	may	also	be	a	hard	sell.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	even	if	the	economic	effect	would	be	similar,	citizens	
might	consider	such	development	as	being	“unfair”.	
	
Finally,	technical	 limits	for	the	implementation	of	the	iVAT	solution	again	includes	the	fact	that	cash	
payments	would	not	be	covered	 (the	 solution	was	designed	with	e-commerce	 transactions	 in	mind	
where	online	payments	are	mainstream),	but	again,	in	the	case	of	imports	it	may	be	assumed	that	cash	
payments	are	usually	not	an	option.	There	is	not	such	issue	with	the	PAYS	solution,	albeit	this	solution	
only	captures	imports	of	goods.	
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4. Conclusions		
	
This	paper	focused	on	the	question	how	to	collect	a	DBCFT	in	the	case	of	imports.	This	is	a	question	
that,	 in	 the	author’s	opinion,	 has	 thus	 far	 not	been	 comprehensively	 addressed	 in	 the	 literature.	 It	
mostly	 sought	 to	 suggest	 that	 a	MOSS	 approach,	 such	 as	 the	 one	 being	 applied	 in	 the	 EU	 for	 VAT	
collection	 on	 inbound	 telecommunication,	 broadcasting	 electronically	 supplied	 services	 (and	 in	 the	
future	also	envisaged	for	imports	of	goods)	is	not	the	right	one,	essentially	because	of	the	disconnect,	
under	such	a	model,	between	substantive	and	enforcement	jurisdiction.		
	
The	paper	then	went	on	to	discuss	possible	alternatives	to	the	MOSS	approach,	including	customer	and	
third	party	collection	models.		
	
A	 first	main	 conclusion	 is	 that	 a	 customer	 collection	procedure	 for	B2C	 imports	would	probably	be	
“conceptually”	challenging	in	the	context	of	a	DBCFT	because,	while	it	is	conceivable	to	require	from	
consumers	that	they	pay	consumption	taxes	separately,	it	would	more	difficult	to	require	from	them	
that	they	pay	a	tax	on	the	profits	generated	by	the	company	(lawyers	and	economists	may	disagree	on	
that	point).	In	contrast,	a	split	payment	procedure	(third	party	collection)	might	be	easier	to	implement,	
whereby	the	bank	operating	the	payment	would	withhold	part	of	the	price	paid	by	the	customer	and	
remit	it	directly	to	the	Treasury	(or	charge	it	on	top	of	the	sales	price).		
	
The	second	main	conclusion	of	this	paper	is	that	an	economically	equivalent	VAT+LTC	would	not	only	
raise	no	WTO	issues	but	could	moreover	potentially	be	collectable	via	a	customer	collection	or	a	third	
party	 collection	model	 and	 therefore	 that	 this	 option	may	deserve	 further	 attention.	However,	 the	
author	also	acknowledged	that	the	VAT+LTC	raises	other	difficulties,	both	for	States	not	yet	having	a	
VAT	that	would	have	to	impose	a	rise	in	prices	to	their	consumers	(although	the	reduction	in	labour	
taxes	should	itself	eventually	result	in	a	reduction	of	prices)	and	for	jurisdictions	having	long	established	
exemptions	and	multiple	rates	structures.	
	
These	are	only	preliminary	findings.	In	view	of	the	potential	advantages	of	taxing	corporate	profits	at	
destination	rather	than	at	origin	(major	simplification	of	current	CIT	system,	reduced	opportunities	for	
BEPS	and	allocation	of	the	taxing	rights	to	the	countries	in	line	with	value	creation),	the	author	suggests	
that	 alternative	 collection	models	 for	 imports	 under	 a	 DBCFT	 should	 be	 further	 researched.	 In	 the	
author’s	 opinion,	 only	 collection	models	 that	would	 allow	 reconciling	 substantive	 and	 enforcement	
jurisdiction	are	worth	being	investigated.	
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